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1 Introduction
The e¤ects of trade liberalization on wage structure, employment, income
distribution, and welfare, havebeena continuing topicofdebate. (See, forex-
ample, Wood (1994), Freeman (1995), Krugman (1995, 2000), Leamer (1998,
2000), Davis (1998), Falvey (1999), Tyers and Yang (1999), and the Review
of International Economics special issue on globalization and labor markets,
August 2000.) Economists participating in this debate typically use a modi-
…ed version1 of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, with …xed endowments of skilled
and unskilled workers. Two prominent exceptions to this …xed endowment
formulation are the papers by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Deardor¤
(2000)2. In both papers, workers choose either to remain unskilled, or to
become skilled by undertaking investment in general human capital. Their
models, however, do not deal with an important fact of the labor market: a
large amount of human capital is …rm-speci…c. In the labor economics liter-
ature, …rm-speci…c human capital has been considered by many authors as
a factor contributing to the stylized fact that in many industries, the wage
pro…le is steeper than the marginal productivity pro…le. (For a review of
the empirical literature on …rm-speci…c human capital, see Hutchens, 1989;
a companion paper by Carmichael, 1989, reviews the underlying theoretical
models, including the path-breaking work of Becker, 1962.) Firm-speci…c hu-
man capital introduces a non-competitive element in wage determination. It
would seem that a model of trade that takes into account this feature could
produce results that are signi…cantly di¤erent from those obtained under the
hypothesis of perfectly competitive labor markets. In particular, in such a
model, the e¤ects of trade liberalization on human capital formation, wage
structure, and welfare could signi…cantly depart from the standard results.
This paper presents a simple model of …rm-speci…c human capital accu-
mulation in an open economy that contemplates trade liberalization. Our
model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate …rm-speci…c skills3,
1For models with non-competitive product markets, see Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) and Neary (2000).
2We should also mention a di¤erent stream of literature that studies instead long-run
issue associated with human capital accumulation. See Lucas (1988), Young (1991), Stokey
(1991), and, for a survey of the trade and growth literature, see Long and Wong (1997).
These authors however focused on long run considerations, and did not consider short-run
issues such as the accumulation of industry-speci…c and …rm-speci…c human capital, in
response to trade liberalization.
3Recall that our approach is di¤erent from that of Findlay and Kiezkowski (1983) andTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 2
knowing that this means their future wages will have to be negotiated, and
that the outcome of negotiation will depend on the pro…tability of …rms
operating in a new trading environment. We obtain a set of interesting re-
sults. A surprising result is that a developing country may be harmed by
trade liberalization. This is in sharp contrast to the standard gains-from-
trade proposition obtained for models built on the assumption of perfectly
competitive markets for goods and factors of production. The main reason
for our loss-from-trade result is that in our model, the labor market is not
perfectly competitive: the wage of workers who possess …rm-speci…c skills
are not taken as given by …rms. When skills are …rm-speci…c, each …rm has
an incentive to negotiate the wage rate after such skills have been accumu-
lated. Thus, under autarky, the market outcome is not Pareto e¢cient. It is
known that, under technological externalities, or common property external-
ities, a move from autarky to free trade may be harmful (see, for example,
Brander and Taylor, 1998, Chichilnisky, 1994). In our model, there are no
externalities, but the lack of a perfectly competitive labor market can cause
distortions that resemble externalities.
We show that, for a developing economy (one which imports the high-
tech good), the expectation oftrade liberalization leads toless human capital
accumulation by workers in the high-tech industry. In the absence of per-
fectly competitive labor markets (in our model wages are negotiated between
management and workers with …rm-speci…c skills), the e¤ect of trade liberal-
ization onthe supply of skills may be welfare-worsening. This concern, which
our model will formalize, has been forcefully expressed in some circle, as the
following quotation from Hirschman (1969, p. 5) illustrates:
“The opponents of free trade have often pointed out that for a variety of
reasons it is imprudent and harmful for a country to become specialized along
certain product lines in accordance with the dictates of comparative advan-
tage. Whatever the merits of these critical arguments, they would certainly
acquire overwhelming weight if the question arose whether a country should
allow itself to become specialized not just along certain commodity lines, but
along factor-of-production lines. Very few country would ever consciously
wish to specialize in unskilled labor, while foreigners with a comparative ad-
vantage in entrepreneurship, management, skilled labor and capital took over
these functions, replacing inferior “local talents.”
Our model can shed light on the e¤ect of trade liberalization on wage
Deardor¤ (2000): these authors assume that human capital is not …rm-speci…c.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 3
gaps. An implication of our model is that the wage gap between high and
lowskill workers increases in the country that exports the high-tech good and
decreases in the country which imports the high-tech good. While this result
is alsopredictedby theHeckscher-Ohlinmodel, we get additional results that
are of interest in understanding wage gaps. For example, in Proposition 6,
we describe the e¤ects of technology shocks and trade shocks on the wage
gap. The combination of technology shocks and trade shocks may explain
the stylized fact that wage gaps have been increasing in all countries. In
section 4 we brie‡y discuss the policy implications of our results as well as
the e¤ects of externalities and uncertainty.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to compare in some details our ap-
proach to human capital formation with those of Findlay and Kierzkowski
(1983) and Deardor¤ (2000.) Apart from the main di¤erence (…rm-speci…c
human capital in our model, versus general human capital in their mod-
els), we should mention several di¤erences and similarities. In Findlay and
Kierzkowski (F-K), workers are ex ante homogenous, but ex post, some of
them become skilled workers, and others remained unskilled. The life-time
income, net of education costs, is the same for both types of workers. Our
model shares this characteristic. Education in F-K is modelled by postulat-
ing a neoclassical function using two inputs (a …xed stock of capital, K, and
students, E) to produce skilled workers Q; under constant returns to scale.
We assume, by contrast, that unskilled workers acquire …rm-speci…c skills
by working within a …rm (which possesses a unit of capital) and incurring
resource costs, a strictly convex function. F-K assume that the produc-
tion functions for the two consumption goods have two substitutable inputs:
skilled labor and unskilled labour. They explain the pattern of trade in
terms of relative factor endowment: a country with a high ratio of capital
to population K=N will export the skilled intensive consumption good. In
our model, comparative advantage can be explained in terms of di¤erences
in endowments, or technology, or cost of education. Unlike F-K, Deardor¤
(2000) assumes that workers are ex ante heterogenous: they di¤er in terms of
ability to learn. Our present model can be extended in this direction, without
changes in the essential results4. The focus of Deardor¤’s paper is policies
for redistributing income, while we focus on the e¤ects of trade liberalization
on welfare and wage gaps.
4In fact, an early version of this paper includes this case.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 4
2 A Basic Model of Human Capital Accumulation
2.1 Assumptions and Notation
We assume that there are two periods. As a …rst step, let us consider a small
open economy, consisting of two sectors, denoted by G, and H. (G and H
stand for general and speci…c human capital respectively.) One can think of
sector G, which produces output QG, as the “low-tech” sector consisting of
goods such as textiles and clothing. The “high-tech” sector’s output, QH;
represents goods such as pharmaceuticals, software, computers, etc. Each
individual in this economy possesses one unit of general human capital, and
can accumulate …rm-speci…c human capital. Let good G be the numeraire
good. The price of this good is PG = 1. The only factor of production used
to produce good G is general human capital. Production in sector G is under
constant returns to scale: one unit of general human capital produces WG
units of good G. Thus the wage rate in this sector is WG in both periods.
Good H is producedusing industry-speci…c physical capital, and workers,
whohave either general or …rm-speci…c human capital. Assume that thereare
NH …rms insector H andthat each …rm is endowedwith one unit of industry-
speci…c physical capital. NH is exogenously given: For the time being, the
price of good H in period t, denoted by Pt , is taken as a parameter. In a
subsequent section, we shall consider autarky equilibrium and show how Pt
is determined endogenously.
We assume that, in sector H, to produce a positive output, a …rm must
have one unit of industry-speci…c physical capital, and exactly one worker: a
second worker would add nothing to output. If the worker (who works with
one unit of industry-speci…c physical capital) has only one unit of general
human capital, then the output is 1 unit of good H. If he has accumulated,
in addition, h units of …rm-speci…c human capital, then the output is 1+¹h,
where ¹ is a positive parameter representing the productivity of …rm-speci…c
human capital in sector H. (Here, h is the worker’s decision variable.) Since
¹ is only relevant in period 2, one may also interpret it as a measure of
technical progress embodied in …rm-speci…c human capital, and ¹h is …rm-
speci…c human capital measured in e¢ciency units.
Initially,workers in sector H have no …rm-speci…c human capital. In pe-
riod 1, each sector H worker decides on h, the amount of …rm-speci…c human
capital he wants to acquire. We assume that, without the …rm’s unit of spe-
ci…c physical capital, the worker cannot acquire …rm-speci…c knowledge. TheTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 5
cost of acquiring …rm-speci…c human capital depends on the amount h. We
assume that to obtain h, a worker must directly incur an e¤ort cost which
is denoted by ®c(h), where ®c(h) is convex and increasing, with c(0) = 0:
(Here ® > 0 is a shift parameter, which we introduce to re‡ect the fact that
di¤erent countries may have di¤erent costs of education.)
We assume for simplicity that for the worker, the cost ®c(h) can be mea-
sured in terms of good G.5 Let N be the number of individuals in this
economy. We assume that N > NH, so that when each …rm in sector H
employs one worker, there are enough workers left to produce the numeraire
good.
At the beginning of period 2, a …rm in sector H that has hired a worker
in period 1 can rehire this worker, who has acquired h ¸ 0 units of …rm-
speci…c human capital, at a wage W2 (which is an outcome of a bargaining
process between the …rm and the worker, to be discussed below), or it can
dismiss that worker, and employ a new worker, who, of course, does not
have …rm-speci…c human capital: If it takes the latter course of action, its
pro…t is ¼R = P2 ¡ WG. This is the …rm’s reservation level of pro…t in its
second-period bargaining with its worker. The experienced worker, on the
other hand, can work in sector G in period two, at the wage WG. This is his
reservation wage in his bargaining with his existing employer:
2.2 Analysis of Wage Pro…les
We now turn to the question of how bargaining determines the wage of the
skilled worker in period 2, given that the worker has acquired h units of …rm-
speci…c human capital. To do this, we use the theory of Nash cooperative
bargaining, according to which the bargaining outcome in period 2 is a pair
(W2;¼2) that maximizes the Nash product, (¼2¡¼R)¯(W2¡WG)1¡¯ subject
to the constraint that
¼2 +W2 = (1 +¹h)P2 (1)
5Alternatively, we can interpret ®c(h) as the cost of education, which uses up real
resources, identi…ed as good G.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 6
where h has been determined in period 1, and is taken as given6 in the
bargaining problem. The parameter ¯ represents the relative bargaining
power of the …rm, where 0 ￿ ¯ ￿ 1. The constraint (1) may be written as
¼2 +W2 = ¼R +WG + S
where S = ¹hP2 is the surplus to be shared by the …rm and the worker.
Solving this maximization problem yields the Nash-bargaining solution
W2 = WG + (1¡ ¯)S (2)
and
¼2 = ¼R+ ¯S (3)
Equation (2) says that the skilled worker’s wage consists of two components:
a wage that he would earnelsewhere, plus a share of the surplus that his skills
(together with the …rm’s capital stock) generate. Equation (3) indicates that
…rm’s pro…t equals the sum of the pro…t it would earn if it were to employ a
worker without …rm-speci…c skills, and its share of the surplus generated by
the skilled worker.
We now show how h is determined in period one. Assume that there is
no uncertainty, and that individuals can borrowand lend at a constant7 rate
of interest r. Then in period 1, a worker in sector H chooses to maximize
his lifetime wage income, net of e¤ort cost,
W1 ¡ ®c(h) +
1
(1+ r)
(WG +(1 ¡ ¯)¹hP2)
where he takes the …rst periodwage, W1; as given. Solving this maximization
problem yields the …rst order condition
(1¡ ¯)¹P2
(1+ r)
¡ ®c0(h) = 0 (4)
6An alternative formulation, which would lead to a di¤erent result, is that the bar-
gaining would take place in period 1, where the outcome would result in a contract that
speci…es how much human capital the worker must acquire, as well as wage rates W1and
W2.
7The question of how r is determined should also be addressed. This can be done
most simply by assuming that individuals maximize life-time utility U1 + ±U2 where Ut is
quasi-linear Ut = u(XHt) +XGt, with u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and ± is a constant, 0 < ± < 1. (Xit
represents the amount of good i consumed in period t.) Then, at an interior equilibrium,
1=(1 + r) = ±.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 7
Condition (4) says that a worker acquires …rm-speci…c human capital to the
point where the discounted marginal gain in wage income in period two is
equal to the marginal e¤ort cost that the worker has to pay in period 1 to
acquire the skills. From this equation, the optimal choice of h, denoted by b h
is a function of P2 and other parameters. We write
b h = b h(P2;¹;¯;®) (5)













(Expectation of higher second period price, or of increased e¢ciency encour-
age workers to accumulate more human capital. On the other hand, a greater
bargaining power on the part of the …rm and higher learning cost lead to less
investment in human capital.)
Using(2) and(5) wecansolveforW2.(Here, wewriteb h(P2)forb h(P2;¹;¯;®)
to save space.)
W2 = WG + (1¡ ¯)¹P2b h(P2) ´ W2(P2) (7)
Thus W2 is increasing in P2.
Next we determine the wage W1 of a sector-H worker in period 1. We
assume that prior to making the job choice decision in period 1; all workers
are identical. This means that in equilibrium the expected life-time income
(net of e¤ort cost) of a sector-H worker must be equal to the alternative
life-time income that he could obtain in sector G:












(1 ¡ ¯)¹P2b h(P2)
i
(9)
Equation (9) says that in period 1, the employer pays the worker his outside
wage, plus the cost of …rm-speci…c education, minus the discounted value of
the surplus8 that the employee can expect to capture in period 2.
8This equation re‡ects the theory of on-the-job training, developed by Gary Becker
(1962).Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 8
2.3 Autarkic Equilibrium
To solve for an autarkic equilibrium, we must specify the demand side. The
question of how r is determined must also be addressed. This can be done
most simply by assuming that individuals maximize life-time utility U1+±U2
where Ut is quasi-linear, i.e., Ut = u(XHt)+XGt, and u(:) is strictly concave
and increasing. The constant ± is the utility discount factor, 0 < ± < 1.
Then, in equilibrium, 1=(1 + r) = ±. (We assume that positive amounts of
each good are consumed in each period.)
There are two alternative speci…cations of demand, but they lead to basi-
cally the same results. Either one assumes that …rms are owned by capitalists
who are distinct from workers: they receive pro…ts, not wages, and they have
the same utility function as workers. Alternatively, one can assume that
each …rm is equally owned by all N workers, and the pro…ts are distributed
to workers, who are shareholders. In this formulation, we can talk about the
representative individual. In what follows, we adopt the second formulation
so that our welfare conclusions do not rely on adding up utilities of di¤erent
individuals.





























where M = WG(1 + 1
1+r) is his life-time wage income (net of learning e¤ort
cost), and (NH=N)¦ is his dividend income, with
¦ = ¼1+ ±¼2
where
¼2 = (1+ ¹b h(P2))P2 ¡ W2(P2) = P2 ¡ WG + ¯¹b h(P2)P2
and
¼1 = P1 ¡W1(P2) = P1 ¡ WG ¡ ®c(b h(P2))+ ±(1¡ ¯)¹b h(P2)P2Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 9
Simplifying, we get




¡ M ¡ ®c(b h(P2)) (12)
We consider interior solutions (i.e., Xi
Ht > 0 and Xi
Gt > 0 for t = 1;2:)
Solving the maximization problem (10) yields the inverse demand func-
tions for the high-tech good for period t:
u0(Xi
Ht) = Pt
from which we obtain the demand functions
X
i
Ht = D(Pt) (13)
where D0 < 0. Thus all individuals have the same demand for good H in
period t. The sum of their demands are
ND(Pt)
Since there are NH high-tech …rms, the supply of the high-tech goods are
given by
QH1 = NH (14)
QH2 = NH(1 +¹b h(P2)) (15)
Equating demand to supply for the high-tech good, we get, for period 1,
ND(P1) = NH (16)
and, for period 2,
ND(P2) = NH(1+ ¹b h(P2)) (17)
These two equations determine the equilibrium autarkic prices P1and P2,
which we denote by P1A and P2A. Next we substitute P2A into (9) to obtain
the period one autarkic wageTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 10







while, for period 2,
W2A = WG +¹(1¡ ¯)¹P2Ab h(P2A)
Weare interestedin…ndingouthowourendogenous variables (W1A;W2A;P1A;P2A)
vary across countries. To so that, we determine how these variables change
with changes in our parameters (¹;¯;®;nH) where nH = NH=N .
2.4 Autarky Results
From (17), we get the autarkic equilibrium price P2A of a country as a func-
tion of the parameters ¹, ¯;® and nH (de…ned as NH=N). Di¤erentiating






























(i) An increase in the economy’s capital labor ratio nH will reduce the










(ii) An increase in the productivity parameter ¹ will reduce the second
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(iii) An increase in the bargaining power of the …rm, ¯, will increase the











(iv) An increasein the education costparameter® will increasethe second









Remark: Result (i) is obvious because a higher nH increases supply rel-
ative to demand, at any given price. Result (ii) is also plausible, because a
higher ¹ will increase human capital accumulation at any given P2, resulting
in a greater supply of good H in period 2 at any given P2 (i.e., a rightward
shift in the supply curve), and hence the equilibrium price must fall in au-
tarky. As to(iii), a greater bargaining power ofthe …rm means that, from the
worker’s point of view, investment in human capital becomes less attractive,
and hence the investment level will be reduced, thus causing second period
output to fall, and price to rise.
The e¤ects of changes in the parameters ¹;¯;®; and nH on second period




















which is ambiguous in sign. Similarly,
@W2A
@A is also ambiguous in sign.
2.5 Loss from trade
We model the passage from autarky to free trade as follows. In period 1,
before labor allocation decisions are made, the government announces that
the country will be opened to trade in period 2. Thus, everyone expects the
price ofthe high-tech good will be the worldprice, P2T, not the autarkic price
P2A. We now show that a developing country (a country that would becomeTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 12
an importer of the high-tech good when trade is opened in period 2) will
su¤er a welfare loss, in the sense that the life-time utility of a representative
consumer is lower under the free trade regime (meaning no-trade in period
1, and free trade in period 2) than under complete autarky.
Consider an open economy that imports the high-tech good under free
trade in period 2. For this economy, the move from autarky to free trade may
be represented by a decrease inP2 (relative to its autarkic PA2). Note that P1
remains unchanged, as it is determined by equation (16) alone. What is the
e¤ect of this decrease in P2 on the welfare of the representative consumer?
Intuitively, the announcement in period 1 that trade will be opened in period
2 causes workers to invest less in education. Their life time wage income (net
of e¤ort cost), M, however, remains at WG(1+±):Their dividend income will
be a¤ected by the fall in P2. Formally, the e¤ect of a fall in P2 on the welfare
is computed as follows.
Recall the demand functions
X
i
H1(P1) = D(P1), X
i
H2(P2) = D(P2) (22)
where D(:) is the inverse function of u0(:). The demand for the numeraire
good G can then be inferred from the budget constraint. Thus
Xi
1G + ±Xi
1G = M +nH¦ ¡ P1D(P1)¡ ±P2D(P2) (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into the direct utility function, we obtain the
life-time indirect utility function
V (P1;P2;M +nH¦) = u(D(P1)) +±u(D(P2))+ nH¦
+M ¡ P1D(P1) ¡ ±P2D(P2) (24)







0(P2)+ D(P2)] + nH
d¦
dP2
= ¡±D(P2) + nH
d¦











































It follows that when a developing economy is opened to trade (the world
price P2 is below P2A);there is a welfare loss. As clear from (26), this loss is
caused by the fall in the level of investment in human capital. We state this
result as Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: If the world price of the high-tech good P2 is marginally
below a country’s autarkic price P2A, the opening of trade will result in a
welfare loss for that country.
Discussion: Proposition 2 is in sharp contrast with the standard gains-
from-trade theorems. The con‡ict can be explained easily. The standard
gains-from-trade results rely on the assumption of perfect competition in the
goods markets and the factor markets. In our model, the labor market is not
perfectly competitive in period 2. Because of …rm-speci…c human capital,
each pair of worker-…rm is involved in a bargaining process in period 2.
3 Direction of Trade and Wage Gaps
In this section, we turn to the e¤ects of trade liberalization on the wage gap.
We assume that the economy under consideration is under autarky in periodTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 14
1. We consider two scenarios. Under scenario 1, the economy remains under
autarky in period 2, and everyone knows this in period 1. Under scenario 2,
the economy will be open to free trade in period 2, and this is also known in
period 1. We call the …rst scenario the autarky scenario, and the second one
the free trade scenario. We assume that the country produces both goods
in each period, under either scenario. (This is the incomplete specialization
assumption.)
We consider a two-country world in which countries di¤er in endowments
(nH), technology (¹), and the cost of education (®).9 If the two countries
di¤er only in the parameter nH, then the country with a greater nH will have
a lower autarkic price P2A. This country will therefore export the high-tech
good under free trade. This is an endowment-based explanation of trade10.
If the two countries have identical nH, then, ceteris paribus, the country
with a higher ¹ will have alower autarkic price P2A, and therefore will export
thehigh-tech good under free trade. This is a technology-based explanationof
trade. Similarly, di¤erence in ® provides an education-cost-based explanation
of trade.
More generally, for any given country, if its second period autarkic price
P2A of the high-tech good is smaller [respectively, greater] than the free trade
world price P2T of that good, then the opening of trade in period 2 (fully
anticipated in period 1) will make that country an exporter [respectively,
importer] of the high-tech good in period 2. Let us denote variables of a
country by a superscript e (m) if it exports (imports) the high-tech good




2T] be the second period wage of a worker in the
high-tech sector of a country that exports [respectively, imports] the high-
tech good under the free trade scenario. Let We
2A [respectively, Wm
2A] be the
second period wage of a worker in the high-tech sector of the same country
under the autarky scenario.
We begin by considering within-country wage gaps. We call We
2T -WG
the wage gap (between skilled workers and unskilled ones) under free trade,
of a high-tech exporting economy. We want to compare this gap to the
corresponding wage gap under autarky, We
2A ¡ WG. Similarly, Wm
2T -WG is
called the wage gap under free trade, of a high-tech importing economy. We
9Di¤erences in ® re‡ect cross-country di¤erences in education cost.
10This is somewhat similar to the Findlay-Kierzkowski result.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 15
want to compare this gap to the corresponding wage gap under autarky,
Wm
2A ¡ WG.
Proposition 3: (E¤ect of trade on wage gaps) For each worker in
the high-tech sector, free trade
(i) increases the wage gap in the high-tech exporting country (relative to
its wage gap under autarky)
(ii) reduces the wage gap of the high-tech importing country (relative to
its wage gap under autarky)
Proof: For (i), we must show that We
2T-WG exceeds We
2A¡ WG. For an
exporting country, P e
2T ¸ Pe











2A¡ WG ¸ W
m
2T ¡ WG (28)
A similar argument applies to the importing country.
Remark: Proposition 3 shows that the e¤ect of international trade on
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers depends on the pattern
of trade. Countries that export the high-tech good will see the wage gap
increase, but importing countries will actually …nd that the wage gap de-
creases with the opening of trade. The intuition for these results is clear.
For example, in the country that exports the high-tech good, the opening of
trade will increase the price of the high-tech good. This increases pro…ts in
that industry and, since skilled workers bargain with …rms over wages, the
workers will share in those increased pro…ts through the bargaining process.
We can also use these results to say something about inter-country wage
gaps.
Corollary: The di¤erence between the wage of skilled workers in the
exporting economy and the importing economy under free trade, We
2T¡Wm
2T,
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Remark: The corollary indicates that trade will also increase the wage
gap between skilled workers across countries. Workers in the high-tech sector
in the exporting country will see their wage rise relative to their counterparts
in countries that import the high-tech good. This is a direct consequence
of the fact that skill premia are increasing in the exporting country, but
decreasing in the importing country.
When trade is endowment-base, equation(30) has a special interpretation
as explained in the next proposition.
Proposition 4: (Wage equalization) If trade is endowment-based,
second-period wages for skilled workers are equalized across countries under
free trade, given the incomplete specialization assumption. The country that
exports the high-tech good under free trade has low autarkic wages of skilled
workers.
Proof: From (7), We
2T = Wm
2T if countries di¤er only in nH. With




Remark: On the other hand, if trade is technology-based, driven by, for















that is, under free trade, the wage of skilled workers in the exporting country
is higher than in the importing country. Then the left-hand side of (30) is
positive, and the right-hand side may be positive or negative.
We next turn toconsiderationof howtrade a¤ects the decisions ofworkers
about how much human capital to accumulate.
Proposition 5: (E¤ect of trade on human capital accumulation)
The opening of trade increases the accumulation of human capital in the
country whose autarkic price P2A is lower than the free-trade price P2T, and
decreases the accumulation of human capital in the country whose autarkic
price P2A is higher than the free-trade price P2T .








Remark: In addition to price e¤ects, trade also has an in‡uence on hu-
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capital accumulation in countries that export the hightech good andreduces
human capital accumulation in the importing country. This result is impor-
tant because it implies that, to some extent, trade-induced wage gaps are
the result not only of direct price e¤ects on wages, but also due to the e¤ect
trade has on the incentive to accumulate human capital.
We next show that in the country that exports the high-tech good, fa-
vorable trade and technology changes tend to increase the wage gap. De…ne
the wage gap for a high-tech exporting country for a given trade volume and
level of technology to be ¢ = ¹ W2 ¡ ¹ WG. Let us introduce two disturbances
for this economy: it experiences a rise in ¹ (improved technology) and it
confronts a ‡ood of excess supply of good G from a collection of developing
economies, which causes the relative price of good G to fall (i.e., the price P2
rises, a favorable terms of trade shock.) Then the change in this economy’s
wage gap can be decomposed into two e¤ects, namely the technology e¤ect
and the trade e¤ect:
d(W2 ¡WG) =
@ (W2 ¡ WG)
@¹
d¹ +
@ (W2 ¡ WG)
@P2
dP2
where, from (2) and (6), the technology e¤ect is










and the trade e¤ect is










Taken together equations (32) and (33) imply that favorable technology
and trade shocks tend to increase the wage gap in the high-tech exporting
country, while unfavorable shocks will reduce the wage gap. These results
are summarized in proposition 6.
Proposition 6: Inthecountry that exports the high-techgood, favorable
(unfavorable) technology and trade shocks increase (decrease) the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers.
Discussion: The combination of very favorable technology shocks and
trade shocks (favorable or unfavorable) may explain the stylized fact thatTrade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 18
wage gaps have been increasing in all countries. While our focus is on the
theoretical decomposition, it seems appropriate to quote Deardor¤ (2000,p.
478): “The outcome of that debate, it seems, is a near consensus that trade
has indeed been a signi…cant cause of these labor market changes, but also
that it has been less important quantitatively than other causes, and most
likely less important than technology.”
4 Extensions
4.1 Income Distribution
In this subsection we analyze the e¤ect of trade and capital accumulation
on factor incomes. Recall that workers within a given country are ex ante
identical. Thus no matter which industry they choose to work in, their
life-time income (net of e¤ort cost), in terms of good G, is WG(1+ 1
1+r). By
assumption of an interior solution, they consume both goods. In this section,
we modify our assumption: now workers are not shareholders. Then, when a
country changes its trading status from autarky to exporter of the high-tech
good, the domestic price P2 rises, and workers are worse o¤. They would
therefore prefer autarky to free trade. Capitalist’s pro…t is increasing in P2.
Thus, capitalists in the high-tech sector prefer exporting to autarky. For a
country that would become an importer of the high-tech good under free
trade, capitalists in the high-tech sector would prefer autarky to free trade,
while the workers would prefer trade to autarky.
4.2 Externalities
We have assumed that the accumulation of human capital by a worker
does not have direct spillover e¤ects on other workers. In the endogenous
growth literature, however, many authors argue that there exists signi…cant
spillovers. Let us indicate brie‡y howour model can be modi…ed to take into
account such bene…cial externalities. An intuitively appealing formulation
would be to modify our model by specifying that the parameter ¹i for indi-
vidual i is an increasing function of the average amount ¹ h of accumulation
of human capital in the industry and of NH
¹i = ¹
0 + Á(¹ hNH); Á
0 > 0 (34)Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 19
The positive externality displayed in (34) implies that a laissez-faire
regime would result in an ine¢ciently low level of accumulation of human
capital. Since one person’s investment in his human capital has a positive
spillover e¤ect on the human capital of others, the government of a small
economy might want to pursue policies that increase the price of the high-
tech good. This would mean that the country that imports the high tech
good under free trade may have an incentive to prohibit such imports so as
to raise the domestic priceP2, thus encouraging more human capital accumu-
lation (as there is under-investment in human capital under laissez-faire). Of
course, there would presumably be other policies that wouldbe more e¢cient
ways to deal with such externalities, but political or revenue considerations
could lead to the adoption of protection.
4.3 Education Policy
In this subsection we brie‡y indicate how one might want to analyze educa-
tion policy in the context of our model. One could think of education policy
a¤ecting two variables in our model, the cost of acquiring education, ® or
the productivity of education ¹. Think of education policy as a¤ecting ¹.
Let ¹0 denote the initial level of the variable ¹. What is the marginal social
bene…t of a policy that directly gives rise to an increase in ¹0? Under free
trade, for a small open economy, P2 is exogenous and hence any increase in
¹0 to a higher value, say ¹0 + "; will increase h, i.e. increase human capi-
tal accumulation. Under autarky, things are slightly di¤erent: any increase
from ¹0 to ¹0 + " will cause the autarkic equilibrium price P2A to fall to
some level e P2A < P0
2A, and this may discourage human capital accumulation.
Since the demand curve for good H is negatively sloped, this price fall means
that the new equilibrium quantity consumed is greater than the old equilib-
rium quantity consumed. This in turns means that the new e¤ective supply
(¹0+")h(¹0+"; e P2A) exceeds the old ¹0h(¹0;P2A), but we cannot be certain
whether h(¹0 + "; e P2A) exceeds h(¹0;P2A). Therefore, under autarky, a pol-
icy that directly increases ¹ may indirectly reduce h. If there are spillover
e¤ects in the economy, and if these e¤ects depend on h rather than ¹h, then
under autarky, a policy that increases ¹ could be harmful. To summarize,
education policy that makes human capital more productive always improves
welfare in a free trading economy. In an autarkic economy such an education
policy may actually reduce welfare.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 20
4.4 Uncertainty
Wecan introduce uncertainty about secondperiod price, but the basicresults
go through. Let s1 be the amount of savings for a worker in period 1. At the
beginning of period 2, when the uncertainty about period 2 price has been
resolved, the worker knows that his second period wage is WG+(1¡¯)¹hP2
and therefore his second period utility is
I2[P2;h;s1] = max
X2H
u(X2H) +[s1(1 +r) +WG + (1¡ ¯)¹hP2 ¡ P2X2H]








= ¡D0(P2) > 0
@I2
@h




In the …rst period, before the uncertainty is resolved, the worker chooses
h and to maximize his expected two-period utility
EU = u(D1(P1)) ¡ [W1 ¡ ®c(h)¡ s1¡ P1D1(P1)]+ ±EI2[P2;h;s1]
where E is the expectation operator (and the random variable is P2).
It is clear from the above that in this simple formulation, uncertainty
does not a¤ect the decision on human capital investment.Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital Accumulation 21
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of …rm-speci…c human capital accumulation and
explored some of its implications. We showed that the opening of trade can
reduce the welfare ofa country which would import the high-tech good under
free trade. Concerning the e¤ect of trade on the wage gap between high and
lowskill workers, we showed that trade liberalization increases the wage gap
in the country that exports the high-tech good, and decreases the wage gap
in the other country. In the real world, countries may face simultaneously
a trade shock and a technology shock. Proposition 6 provides a way of
decomposing the changes in wage gaps.
Other issues that can be considered within the framework of our model
include (i) wage dispersion (this is particularly important if individuals dif-
fer in their ability to learn),(ii) political economy e.g., lobbying activities by
potential gainers and losers, (iii) migration e.g., since it is cheaper to accu-
mulate high-tech human capital in advanced countries, there is an incentive
to migrate to these countries. Some results concerning wage dispersion have
been reported in Long, Riezman, and Soubeyran (2001) in a model where
workers di¤er with respect to learning ability.
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